Tuesday, January 29, 2013

The Sovereign and the Subordinate

Nietzsche spends much of this reading explicating the origins of conscience and guilt through the analysis of historical culture.  Yet he rapidly moves away from his presentation of the "man-animal" as memory quickly complicates him and as Nietzsche describes it "by means of the morality of custom and the social strait-jacket" (40).  I waited until section ten to find a correlation between the nature images of the first essay and the ideal human function Nietzsche would use to undermine the society of suffering he was explicating and was disappointed.  In the beginning of this essay Nietzsche presents a society and more importantly a culture that is non-conducive to the existence of the noble "man-animal"and uses this to further his attack on our society of suffering and presents it as a control of the "aggressive men" which most closely describe his noble man-animal of action in our society (55).

Nietzsche begins his argument by presenting the correlation between the origin of punishment and then the purpose of suffering.  He clearly identifies these two states as different because he specifically analyzes this two concepts in terms of their cause and effect in relation to each other.  According to Nietzsche punishment developed out of a need to establish specific memories within the "man-animal", "with the aim of hypnotizing the whole nervous system and intellect by means of these 'fixed ideas'; in essence to scare the "man-animal" straight.  This is the beginning of the societal interference that Nietzsche sees as a control of the "man-animal" literally interfering with the natural order becoming a "means against struggle itself" to uphold norms rather than uphold justice.

In terms of our society Nietzsche clearly attributes "bad conscience" to the ressentiment which by definition of dichotomy establishes a "good conscience" in our society as well (55).  The "bad conscience" is a derivative of the debtor-creditor relationship, in which an expected return on injury is expected and demanded rather than taken.  Thus the relationship of injury and compensation becomes a means of upholding the norm rather than settling the struggle between the two parties. Nietzsche believes that the law instead of acting as a "means against struggle itself"should rather mediate "in the struggle between power-complexes".  In this sense Nietzsche gives "good conscience" to the individual  who readily moves to empower himself and take action; here I believe Nietzsche becomes less clear whether he actually condones a sort of vigilante justice but is clear in that he doesn't support settlement declaring that "the law represents rather the struggle against reactive feelings, the war against the these feelings in the active and aggressive forces" (55).  In Nietzsche's mind the law aims to establish an "impartial eye" to dictate reaction and recompense but Nietzsche sees the man in "good conscience", the noble man, as having had and always will have the "the freer eye, the better conscience on his side".  To Nietzsche justice is justified most clearly in the action of "the strong, the spontaneous, the aggressive man" (55).

Discussion questions:
-Nietzsche almost vaguely leaves the concept of justice to the "aggresive man" as open-ended, did you see an appropriation of the 'lawful' extent the agressor could take his justice?

Nietzsche shortly addresses the concept of a society based in the "consciousness of power" on the bottom of page 53 where the creditor is the individual who can most completely sustain harm "without suffering".
-The quote on the following page "of what concern are these parasites to me...I am strong enough to allow that" is the most clear comparison to the nature images we saw in the previous essay.  What correlation do you see between the bird/sheep metaphor and the man with the power of consciousness.  -Also who does this 'man of consciousness' most clearly resemble in our culture (I find it ironic).

4 comments:

  1. In Morgan’s post he points out that Nietzsche can be confusing in regards to vigilante justice. I believe there is evidence in the text that he does in fact advocate for creditors to take justice into their own hands. Nietzsche states that when one is a member of society “one lives protected, looked after, in peace and trust, without a care for certain forms of harm and hostility to which the man outside, the ‘outlaw’ is exposed” (52). Being a member of society grants one the privilege of safety; one has no guarantee of being free from harm or attack if one is not inside the law. When an individual violates the law and places himself outside of it, “every kind of hostility may be vented on him” (53). In this way, actions of vigilantes are endorsed by Nietzsche, because there is no reason not to express violence against those with no protection from the law.

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  2. Morgan's point about the lawmaking system reminded me of a quotation that I found particularly interesting. Nietzsche says that.the law dictates that "what in its eyes passes as permitted, as right, and what as forbidden, as wrong" (56). This seems to be yet another example of the underlying theme or a decided morality. He goes on to say that "'right' and 'wrong' exist only from the moment the law is established" (56). I would have thought that Nietzsche would have appreciated that the lawmakers saw that they had power and used it accordingly, but I also know that he doesn't believe in the ideas of right or wrong. As Morgan pointed out, it seemed like justice was a vague topic when it came to deciphering what Nietzsche wants.

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  3. While Lachlan makes a fair point regarding a possible view of vigilantes as expressed by Nietzsche, I do not believe that the issue is quite that clear. While Nietzche does state that "every kind of hostility may be vented on [an outlaw]” (53) he also states, a few pages later, that the "active, attacking, encroaching man is still a hundred paces closer to justice than his reactive counterpart" (55). Someone taking revenge on a criminal for their crimes is acting in a reactive fashion, and as such, is acting less justly than the original sinner. Instead, Nietzsche seems to claim that justice is merely the strong doing what is best for themselves. Since reactive action is unjust, it follows that revenge is a poor motive. Indeed, Nietzsche claims that the ideal "just man remains just even in his dealings with those who do him harm" (55). Regret, guilt, anger and other such reactive emotions are not what should be employed -- instead, people should act simply as is most advantageous for them. Killing criminals for the supposed benefit of society at large brings little advantage to the vigilante. Though, as Nietzsche claims, those outside the law are indeed fair game for any within the protections of society, the negligible benefits proceeding from such actions (in general) leads me to believe that Nietsche would tell off vigilantes as having slipped into the reactive role.

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  4. Continuing evidence for Gabe's argument is shown on page 54 where Nietzsche says that people who are taking reactive action cannot usually separate their emotion from their action.
    "...it is from this spirit of ressentiment that scientific fairness grows... this 'scientific fairness' is immediately abdicated, leaving room for accents of moral enmity and prejudice..." (54). This means that in responding to action, people are likely to unjustly overreact, because their reaction is based upon ressentiment, therefor, I think that Nietzche would not be in favor of total vigilante justice.

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