Thursday, January 24, 2013

Nietzsche's Moral Power


In the First Essay of On The Genealogy Of Morals, Nietzsche questions the intrinsic value of everything “good”. Nothing starts with any value in his view. Based on his tone, attidude towards other respected thinkers, and society, Nietzsche thinks himself better than most other people. He does not care about insulting others for what he sees as wrong. Therefore, he feels free to attack all he pleases, and truths preached by other groups have less standing than he does, especially religion.
            In sections five and six of the preface he addresses his big subject: “the value of morality” (7) and in his first essay focuses on the origin of good. When patronizing psychologists Nietzsche reminds them of the existence of “unChristian, immoral truth… For such truths do exist” (12). Nietzsche is not willing to limit himself to what other people preach, and he scoffs at anyone who does. Since religion as he experiences it tells people what to think without logically explaining why to Nietzsche’s satisfaction. He sees religious emphasis on “’good’ and ‘unegoistic’ actions” (13) pushing Europe towards “Buddhism? towards—nihilism?” (7). As someone who thinks very highly of himself in comparison to others, the idea of acting selfless to the point of no longer prioritizing personal wants for the sake of religion seems undesirable. He specifically names the synonymous nature of “moral” and “unegoistic” as a “mental illness” (13).
However, Nietzsche’s dislike of religion stretches beyond wanting to live with personal comforts. He thinks religious practices are ridiculous and  “unhealthy” because they “combine brooding with emotional volatility”(18). Ironically, the volatile Nietzsche (at least in voice) writes this as he broods over the origin of good.  In his incredible zeal to bash religion Nietzsche fails to provide reasons why those practices are so unhealthy, but it is understandable how a free mind like Nietzsche would feel restricted by people he sees as lesser telling him how to live. 
Having already informed his reader about his hatred of religion, Nietzsche then makes unsupported and inappropriate (in the modern moral sense) attacks specifically against Judaism and Christianity. Not only is he incredibly derogatory, describing Jews as “the people of the most downtrodden priestly vindictiveness” but readers must also take his word on this matter, because he provides no evidence (19). To him, society values politeness and the values of society should be doubted, and therefore Nietzsche has no need to be polite. In addition to being nasty and belittling, he also makes another claim against religion: because religion does not have direct control, it must justify itself by turning the rules of goodness against those with direct power, the nobility, reversing them to support religious life (19). Nietzsche would say my negative opinions of his behavior are in fact the result of successful religious mutation of good. Religious emphasis on protecting the weak has made me instinctively respect others.
What Nietzsche does not express is the value of a moral system that helps people live together in peace (we have achieved this with limited/debatable success). If everyone acted like Nietzsche, society would not function. Perhaps he will decide there is moral truth, or a reason to act morally he can support. However, after the first segment we read, Nietzsche claimed for himself unlimited power to determine moral truth by seeing himself as better than everyone else.

Questions: Does religion have as strong a claim as Nietzsche to knowing “good” because it sees itself as truth?
Can the historical sense of good be scaled? If in his view, Nietzsche is better than everyone else, and good value is derived from power, is everything he does good, because he is in his own position of power?

5 comments:

  1. Joshua, I agree with you in your assertion that "Nietzsche thinks himself as better than most other people." Continually, he is not afraid to belittle the work of others. If fact, he begins his first essay with insult saying, "as living and breathing enigmas, this gives them, I confess, an essential advantage over their books—they themselves are interesting" (11)! Nietzche here is so direct in his criticism that I laughed when I read this. He thinks that these philosophers have boring books. At the same time though, I think that Nietzsche says this because he has a very different sense of what is "good" and "bad".

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  2. I believe it can be agreed that Nietzche is not the biggest fan of religion, or English psychologists. What interested me about your comment Marlee was your opinion that he "has a very different sense of what is 'good' and 'bad.'" I think your right in a way. Nietzche talks about morals by stating "our thoughts, our values, our yeses and noes and ifs and whethers grow out of us...[like] a tree bears its fruits" (4). In other words, what we determine as "good," "bad," "right," or "wrong" come from some necessity for us to have them. He states "the judgement 'good' does not derive from those to whom 'goodness' is shown! Rather the good themselves" (12). I think Nietzche does have a specific view of what is "good" or "bad" and where they come from, and it seems to be greatly different than just accepting them from religious examples.

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  3. Joshua, your focus on Nietzche's view of religion reminds me of what Marx has to say on this subject. On page 71, he defines religion as "a particular form of production" that "falls under its general law." Though less acerbic than Nietzche, Marx does seem to share a disdain for religion, defining it (and thus the morals it represents) as systematic and manmade and thus not valuable. In fact, he asserts that "the more man attributes to God, the less he retains in himself (60). Perhaps by this he means that people do not even recognize their creations (beliefs, morals) as their own. In the same way, Nietzche argues that all morals and religions are human constructs; humans just don't realize it. I think that maybe this is the "mental illness" of which he speaks. He views religion as the product of people imagining that things in their head are real, and he sees this "disillusionment" as useless and contrived. With that said, I really can't answer your question about why Nietzche does not see the "value of a moral system that helps people live together in peace." For someone who seems to value what is concrete (I think? I don't know), he certainly brushes off what looks to me like a tangible outcome.

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  4. I think that one of the reasons that Nietzsche looks down upon religion is because religion has combined unegoism with good, which has become a standard for all religious people. Nietzsche makes a proof that "there is from the outset absolutely no necessary connection between the word 'good", and 'unegoistic' actions" (13). He then says religion does makes this connection, and it inevitably becomes the standard because of peoples' "herd instinct" (13) to accept things for what they are, and not look at the history of things. Nietzsche specifically singles out Judaism, and calls Jewish hatred "the kind of hatred that creates ideals, and changes the meaning of values" (20). So overall, Religion's role in changing the definition of values and peoples' acceptance of these values as true, is Nietzsche's cause to look down upon religion.

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  5. I think, like the previous commenters, that Nietzsche clearly critiques religion. What I specifically found interesting was Iska's comment about the ideas of "right" and "wrong," etc. coming from a place of necessity. In stating that goodness is not championed by those who actually possess goodness, Nietzsche claims in effect that what is good is good, not because of the person received goodness but because of the person doing the good. I found that this made the effect of goodness tangential to the actual act of goodness, which I think plays a role in his rejection of religion, which largely revolves around a god's goodness toward subjects.

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